Article
Article name The Problems of the Nature of Mind and Consciousness in the Decisions of the Traditional and Modern Buddhist Thought
Authors Kolesnikov A.S. Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, kolesnikov1940@yandex.ru
Bibliographic description Kolesnikov A. S. The Problems of the Nature of Mind and Consciousness in the Decisions of the Traditional and Modern Buddhist Thought // Scholarly Notes of Transbaikal State University. Social Sciences Series. 2017. Vol. 12, No. 3. PP. 141–153. DOI: 10.21209/2500-171X-2017-12-3-141-153.
Section SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
UDK 24-1
DOI 10.21209/2500-171X-2017-12-3-141-153
Article type
Annotation The spread of Buddhism in the world is accompanied by a growing interest in Buddhist thought as a potential source of the alternative of the concept of consciousness nature as a relationship between the mental and the physical. When considering traditional models of modern philosophy of consciousness, there is a possibility of not only comparing it with Buddhist philosophy but also the reception of its individual aspects in the philosophy of consciousness correlated with Physicalism (naturalized Buddhism) and the phenomenological approach. The phenomenological approach perceives from Buddhism a non-dualistic relationship between the mental and the physical. For philosophers of consciousness prone to materialism, Buddhism is a religion without the monotheistic God of the creator, and in some of its forms and deities in general. In the philosophy of consciousness, interest in alternatives to materialism has revived, and here too, it is a source of the attractiveness of Buddhist thought. The most prominent traditional alternative to materialism in the Western philosophy of consciousness is the type of substantial dualism proposed by Descartes. The philosophers, attracted by non-materialistic representations of consciousness, reject duality because of the traditionally related problems. Buddhist theories of consciousness are attracted by the fact that they resist direct materialism, but also reject the notion that the mind is an irrelevant matter, since they annul the concept that there are substances in general, either mental or material. The Models of the modern philosophy of consciousness, faced with significant difficulties in explaining the interaction of the mental and physical, in the opinion of the researchers, are partly solvable in the model of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna. Neutral non-duality, unlike physicalism, dualism, and consciousness-based representations, does not generate ontological obligations that are incompatible with these facts.
Key words Buddhist consciousness philosophy, mental and physical, Physicalism, phenomenological approach, not-dualistic model, Nagarjuna
Article information
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Full articleThe Problems of the Nature of Mind and Consciousness in the Decisions of the Traditional and Modern Buddhist Thought