Article
Article name Estimating the Parameters of the Arbitration Procedure with Incomplete Information
Authors Tokareva J.S. Candidate of Physics and Mathematics, jtokareva2@mail.ru
Bibliographic description
Section Scientific Research
UDK B 183.3
DOI
Article type
Annotation The paper considers the bargaining model of two persons with incomplete information. The players – a manager and a Labor Union representative – address the arbitration committee to resolve the conflict. Supposing that in a zero-sum game the players do not know or know partially the parameters of the distributions of the committee members’ opinions, the article assesses the interval size defined by the optimum players’ strategies. It considers a case with an odd number of committee members whose opinions have a normal distribution with a known mean value and an unknown standard square deviation that, in its turn, is modeled by a random variable. The article presents the size of the interval between the optimum players’ strategies. These values can be used to define the minimum number of arbitration committee members to perform certain conditions.
Key words zero-sum game, negotiations, incomplete information, arbitration committee.
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Full articleEstimating the Parameters of the Arbitration Procedure with Incomplete Information