| Article |
|---|
| Article name |
Estimating the Parameters of the Arbitration Procedure with Incomplete Information |
| Authors |
Tokareva J.S. Candidate of Physics and Mathematics, jtokareva2@mail.ru |
| Bibliographic description |
|
| Section |
Scientific Research |
| UDK |
B 183.3 |
| DOI |
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| Article type |
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| Annotation |
The paper considers the bargaining model of two persons with incomplete information.
The players – a manager and a Labor Union representative – address the arbitration committee
to resolve the conflict. Supposing that in a zero-sum game the players do not know or know
partially the parameters of the distributions of the committee members’ opinions, the article
assesses the interval size defined by the optimum players’ strategies. It considers a case with
an odd number of committee members whose opinions have a normal distribution with a
known mean value and an unknown standard square deviation that, in its turn, is modeled by
a random variable. The article presents the size of the interval between the optimum players’
strategies. These values can be used to define the minimum number of arbitration committee
members to perform certain conditions.
|
| Key words |
zero-sum game, negotiations, incomplete information, arbitration committee. |
| Article information |
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| References |
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| Full article | Estimating the Parameters of the Arbitration Procedure with Incomplete Information |
