| Article |
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| Article name |
On the Issue of SFE Correspondence to Expected Behavior at the Uniform Price Auction |
| Authors |
Vasin A.A.Doctor of Physics and Mathematics, Professor vasin@cs.msu.suGusev A.G.Postgraduate student of the Department of Operations Research, Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics ag.ogk1@gmail.com |
| Bibliographic description |
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| DOI |
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| UDK |
УДК 519.8 |
| Article type |
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| Annotation |
We consider a game corresponding to the uniform price supply function auction for
homogenous goods. For a symmetric oligopoly with uncertain demand depending on a random
parameter, Klemperer and Mayer (1989) established the existence and studied the properties
of the supply function equilibrium (SFE) under general assumption on the cost and demand
functions of the market. We consider the best reply dynamics for a repeated auction game
and show that under a linear marginal cost function, it converges to the SFE with a geometric
rate. However, for a fixed marginal cost and limited production capacity, the best reply may
not exist at some stage, so the dynamics do not converge to SFE in general.
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| Key words |
supply function auction, best reply dynamics. |
| Article information |
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| Full article | On the Issue of SFE Correspondence to Expected Behavior at the Uniform Price Auction |
